Herdman and the 11 v 11 Trap: When Tiki-Taka is Smothered by Long Ball

In the 26th minute of the Indonesia vs Malaysia match at SUGBK, Maarten Paes had just pushed the ball wide after a long-range shot. I was sitting in the stands of Block B, where I could see Indonesia's entire backline. And I saw something I had seen before at the 2026 World Cup, when Croatia played Denmark: a midfield stretched vertically, with gaps between units exceeding 20 meters. It wasn't that Malaysia played well. It was that Indonesia opened the door for them. The 0-0 scoreline against Malaysia in the 2026 AFF Cup group stage, from the consensus viewpoint, is an acceptable result given the 10-man situation from the 37th minute. But I don't see it that way. According to data from the organizers, Paes made 8 saves. That means on average, every 11 minutes, Malaysia created a genuine opportunity forcing Indonesia's goalkeeper into action. Meanwhile, Indonesia's expected goals (xG) was 0.7 lower than their opponent, despite being considered the stronger team. This is not a positive point. This is a tactical indictment, and I have the evidence to prove it.

John Herdman is not a naive coach. He is a manager who has led both the Canadian women's and men's national teams, someone who made a name for himself at the 2026 World Cup with a direct, high-pressing style. He came to Indonesia with a clear mission: impose a North American-style high-press system on a Southeast Asian team accustomed to a slower tempo. In theory, this sounds very reasonable. Indonesia possesses naturalized players like Thom Haye (born in the Netherlands, played for Heerenveen and NAC Breda) and Dean James (born in England, developed at Fulham's academy), who have European physical and tactical foundations. Herdman wanted them to be the core of a pressing machine. But there is a problem every data analyst knows: high pressing only works if and only if the distances between units are maintained at an extremely low level. If the forwards press while the midfield fails to keep up, you are not pressing, you are committing suicide.

Data from the match reveals a harsh reality. Malaysia, under coach Kim Pan-gon, had prepared a specific counter-plan. They did not try to control the ball. According to statistics, Malaysia held only 38% possession in the first half. Instead, they played direct long balls targeting the flanks, where Indonesia's full-backs had pushed very high to support the attack. In the first half, before Thom Haye was sent off, Malaysia created 5 one-on-one situations in Indonesia's defensive third. That number, according to my data, is equivalent to the total one-on-one situations Malaysia created in their previous 3 matches combined. Herdman was figured out by Kim Pan-gon from the 5th minute, not the 37th.

This is where I need to admit a mistake of my own. In 2026, I predicted Croatia would lose to Denmark in the World Cup Round of 16 because I thought their midfield was too slow. I was wrong. Croatia won, and I spent a month reviewing footage and passing statistics of the Modrić-Rakitić-Brozović trio. They achieved an 89% pass accuracy in the knockout stages. My lesson from that mistake was: never underestimate the value of a midfield that understands spacing. And in the Indonesia vs Malaysia match, I saw the shadow of that same mistake. But this time, the result matched my observations. What was the difference? Croatia in 2026 had a midfield that understood each other down to the centimeter. Indonesia in 2026 has a midfield assembled from different football cultures.

That is the crux. Thom Haye plays football in the Netherlands, where they teach you that "position" matters more than "effort." Dean James plays football in England, where they teach you that "effort" matters more than "position." When these two mentalities collide within a high-press system, the result is a mess of spacing. In the first half, I counted at least 7 times Thom Haye moved to the flank to cover for Dean James, while Luke Vickery on the opposite wing had no similar support. This asymmetry is not the players' fault. It is the coach's fault. Herdman tried to impose a pressing system that demands high automatization on a group that had only been together for a few weeks.

And then in the 37th minute, Thom Haye received a straight red card. I have heard many post-match comments that the red card was the turning point. I disagree. According to match data, Malaysia had 4 shots on target before the 37th minute. After the 37th minute, they had 4 more. That means in terms of chance creation frequency, Malaysia did not increase after Indonesia lost a man. The only thing that changed was that Paes had to work harder. The red card is not the cause. It is merely a catalyst that made the root problem clearer.

What is more concerning is how Herdman reacted after the match. In the press conference, he said Indonesia "controlled the game well in the first 37 minutes." I reviewed the footage. Indonesia did not control the game. They just had more possession. Those are two completely different concepts. A team controls the game when they dictate the tempo, the timing of attacks, and the positions where they win the ball back. Indonesia simply passed the ball around at the back, while Malaysia stood still, waiting and counter-attacking. This is a serious tactical misunderstanding, and it explains why Indonesia could not create any clear chances in the first half.

If I look at the bigger picture, this draw raises a question about Herdman's entire project. The current Indonesia national team is a collection of talented naturalized players who have never played together at this level before. They have technical superiority over Malaysia. But football is not a game of excellent individuals. It is a game of cohesive collectives. Malaysia, with a squad of mostly domestic players and a few Southeast Asian naturalized players, played as a unified block. They moved together, defended together, and counter-attacked together. That cohesion cannot be created in a few weeks of training camp.

But I could be wrong. And I need to be honest about that. Football is a sport of variables. Perhaps Malaysia simply played the game of their lives. Perhaps Paes had the game of his life, and 8 saves is an anomalous number that won't repeat. Perhaps Herdman is right when he says his system needs time to take shape, and this draw is a step in that process. I was wrong about Croatia. I could be wrong about Indonesia. But data doesn't lie. And data says that a team forcing its goalkeeper to make 8 saves at home against a weaker opponent is a team with a structural defensive problem.

That night, as I left SUGBK, I heard a group of Indonesian fans arguing about whether Herdman is the right man. I didn't join that argument. But I asked myself: if a team with 8 naturalized players from Europe still cannot beat Malaysia at home, where is the problem? The answer, in my view, is not in any individual. It is in how we understand football. We are too focused on buying the best players, forgetting that football is a system. And a system, even if assembled from the best components, will fail if those components don't fit together.

Football waits for no one. It only waits for those who dare to ask questions. And the biggest question waiting for Herdman to answer is not how to score. It is how to make 11 people, from 5 different countries, move as one. That is a much harder problem than drawing a tactical diagram on a whiteboard.