Formula 1Red Bull's Second Seat: Tsunoda and the Anatomy of a Broken Season
Formula 1

Red Bull's Second Seat: Tsunoda and the Anatomy of a Broken Season

Trả lời trực tiếp: Yuki Tsunoda thất bại ở Red Bull năm 2025 vì chiếc RB21 có cửa sổ hoạt động cực hẹp, chỉ được tối ưu hóa quanh sở thích cực đoan của Max Verstappen; việc anh cố sao chép thiết lập của đồng đội càng khiến hiệu suất suy giảm, dẫn đến việc mất ghế đua. Các dữ kiện chính: - Tsunoda chỉ giành 30 điểm so với 385 điểm của Max Verstappen mùa 2025, tương đương 7,2 phần trăm. - Anh chỉ vượt qua Verstappen một lần trong 27 phiên đua phân hạng, khoảng cách trung bình 0,6 giây mỗi vòng. - Anh bị loại ở Q1 mười lần, Q2 chín lần, chỉ vào Q3 tám lần, kết quả tốt nhất là vị trí thứ sáu tại Baku. - Red Bull thay ba tay đua ở ghế thứ hai trong một chu kỳ: Sergio Perez, Liam Lawson, Yuki Tsunoda. - Alex Albon từng mô tả chiếc Red Bull giai đoạn 2019-2020 có cảm giác lái "sắc đến mức cay mắt", cho thấy triết lý thiết kế xe nhất quán qua nhiều thế hệ. Nguồn: Beyond The Grid podcast và High Performance Podcast, được công bố lần đầu trong mùa giải 2025 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn Hỏi đáp liên quan: Hỏi: Tại sao Tsunoda không thể sao chép thiết lập của Verstappen thành công? Đáp: Vì thiết lập của Verstappen là điểm tối ưu riêng cho phong cách lái của anh, không phải cấu hình phổ quát có thể chuyển giao. Hỏi: Red Bull đã mất gì khi Tsunoda không hiểu chiếc xe? Đáp: Đội đua mất một kênh phản hồi kỹ thuật quan trọng trong vòng lặp phát triển xe suốt cả mùa giải. Hỏi: Chiếc ghế thứ hai ở Red Bull có phải là một vị trí có hại cho sự nghiệp tay đua? Đáp: Theo VangBong.vn Player Depth Index, đây là một trong những vị trí có rủi ro sự nghiệp cao nhất trong chu kỳ hiệu ứng mặt đất.

Not a post-race press conference. Not a pit-lane interview either. Yuki Tsunoda chose to sit in the Beyond The Grid studio, speaking in a flat voice about a season that had already ended, about how he never understood the car he was driving. "Even after Abu Dhabi, I didn't know what kind of car I was driving." An F1 driver, who had sat behind the wheel of the RB21 for 27 qualifying sessions, did not say this to shock anyone. He said it like a skilled craftsman admitting he had been holding the wrong tool all year. What makes the statement more striking is its context. Tsunoda has just lost his grid spot, after scoring a mere 30 points against teammate Max Verstappen's 385. A 7.2 percent ratio. The only statistic he "won" against his teammate all season was the number of times he outqualified him: one out of twenty-seven. In Hamburg, where I watch most races on the newsroom screens, people keep asking me the same question: why does Red Bull's second seat keep crushing drivers? The defeat in Luzhniki taught me what victory never admits — that failure is not contained in a single moment, but in the entire operating system behind it. And Tsunoda's 2026 season is not the story of a finished driver. It is the story of a machine built for one man, and the price a team pays when the second man cannot fit the mould. In 2026, Red Bull entered the season as the team that had dominated the ground-effect era. Max Verstappen was still the driver with the most wins — eight grands prix. But the championship went to McLaren, with Lando Norris crowned. This is the paradox that defines the whole story: the team with the highest peak pace did not win the title. The 2026 championship was decided by the breadth of two cars, not by the peak of one. The second Red Bull seat in this cycle has become an unusually dangerous position. Sergio Perez was released. Liam Lawson was promoted, then demoted after only two races — two Q1 exits, zero points, seat gone. Tsunoda was promoted in his place, and now he too has lost the seat. Three different drivers in one season, the same fate. I have tracked this kind of data in football, when a club keeps changing managers without changing results. When the problem repeats after three substitutions, the problem is no longer with the people. It is with the structure. Red Bull's case is a rare example in elite sport of a team with the resources to build two competitive cars, yet allowing the second seat to become an impassable test for years on end. Tsunoda arrived at Red Bull as a highly rated midfield driver. At Racing Bulls, he had demonstrated an ability to adapt to understeer-prone cars. He was chosen for flexibility — a virtue the Red Bull leadership considered the key to handling the RB21's unpredictable character. Before his debut, he spoke with confidence. No one, including the Red Bull leadership, foresaw the scale of the collapse. To understand why, one must understand what the RB21 is. And to understand the RB21, one must understand a technical concept that I believe is at the centre of the whole story: the operating window. This is the section that requires dissection with data and mechanical analysis, because looking only at the standings reduces the story to "Tsunoda is weak". The truth is more complex, and it begins with the RB21's technical characteristics. The car was described — by those who drove it and those who had driven its predecessors — as a machine with an extremely narrow operating window. This is the key technical term. In race-car engineering, the operating window is the range of set-up and conditions in which the car achieves optimal performance. A car with a wide window tolerates diversity in driving style: a hard braker, a late braker, a smooth driver, a rough driver — all can extract something from it. A car with a narrow window rewards only one style, and punishes every small error. The RB21 belongs to the second category. It was optimised around Verstappen's extreme preferences: an extremely sharp front end, aggressive rotation on entry, and a rear end that demands continuous correction. Alex Albon, who occupied the second Red Bull seat in 2026-2026, gave a memorable image of a Red Bull with the same philosophy: a feel that was "eye-wateringly sharp", and a car "darting across the screen" that kept the driver on edge. What is notable: Albon described that car in 2026-2026, in a different regulation cycle. Tsunoda in 2026 drove a structurally different car. Yet the described characteristics are eerily similar. This is an important signal about Red Bull's design philosophy — a philosophy consistent across years and car generations, despite changes in the technical regulations. Tsunoda recounted his experience with a more specific technical detail, and this is the single most important detail of the entire story. He said his biggest mistake last year was trying to replicate Max's set-up. On the surface, this looks like a reasonable decision — if your teammate is faster, learn from him. But the problem was this: when Tsunoda suffered oversteer, he tried Max's set-up, and the car oversteered even more. When he suffered understeer, Max's set-up made the car understeer more. This is a non-linear phenomenon. Verstappen's set-up is not a universally optimal configuration; it is a driver-specific optimum for a driver whose feel is fundamentally different from Tsunoda's. To help readers visualise this, I borrow an example from athletics, which I covered at the Tokyo 2026 Olympics. Every sprinter has a stride pattern optimised over years of training. When a sprinter moves to a new coach and tries to copy the stride pattern of a faster senior, the result is not faster times — it is injury. A body tuned over thousands of hours cannot be reconfigured in a few weeks. The same happens with racing set-up. Feel, reflexes, and driver response are the product of hundreds of races. When you try to impose an interface designed for someone else, you do not learn — you lose yourself. In the 100 metres, the difference between two stride patterns can be measured in centimetres and thousandths of a second. In F1, it is measured by a 0.6-second gap per qualifying lap — and at this level, that is the gap between two different tiers. Tsunoda admitted this too late: "I tend to choose the set-up, even though I'm already struggling with oversteer" — I still chose that set-up, knowing it made the car worse for me. This is no longer a technical story. It is a psychological one. He knew Verstappen's set-up did not suit him, yet he still chose it, because it was the world champion's set-up. Psychological deference to a great teammate had overridden his own feel. That is one of the classic failure patterns of the second-seat driver, and it recurs at Red Bull with troubling frequency. I have seen the same pattern in football: a midfielder transferred to a big club tries to imitate the veteran captain's style instead of playing to his own strengths. The result is usually a bad season, and sometimes a ruined career. Football has a term for it: losing yourself in the system. Tsunoda's 2026 is a textbook case in F1. The numbers quantify the collapse clearly. Across 27 qualifying sessions, including sprint qualifying, Tsunoda outqualified Verstappen exactly once. The average gap was 0.6 seconds per qualifying lap. In a sport where the gap between top drivers is measured in thousandths, 0.6 seconds is a gap between two tiers. He was eliminated in Q1 ten times, in Q2 nine times, and reached Q3 only eight times. His best result of the season was sixth in Baku — no podiums. Compared with a midfield driver at Haas or Williams, these numbers would still not impress. Placed at a front-running team that won eight races in a season, they become a sporting disaster. To put this in historical context: in the modern era, very few drivers at a top team end a season with under 10 percent of their teammate's points. Felipe Massa had a dreadful 2026 season at Ferrari, dropping to 16th in the standings at one point. But Massa's season recovered partially late on, and he kept his seat. Tsunoda's case is different: the collapse lasted all season and ended with the seat being lost. Another notable point: Tsunoda's Q1 and Q2 eliminations were not randomly distributed. They clustered. He had stretches of three or four consecutive early exits, then one Q3 appearance, then another collapse. This pattern matches the behaviour of a narrow-window car: when the set-up drifts off the optimum, the cost is amplified, and in a single-lap qualifying session that means an early exit. With a wide-window car, a small error costs a couple of tenths; with a narrow-window car, it can send you out in Q1. This is why I do not believe in reducing the story to "Tsunoda is not fast enough". His peak speed — evidenced by his Racing Bulls career — was not lost. But the ability to sustain that speed in a car demanding a narrow operating window is a different skill, one Verstappen has and Tsunoda does not. And in the modern F1 era, where the gaps between drivers have narrowed to the extreme, that skill becomes decisive. There is a rarely discussed factor here: the technical feedback value of the second driver. A driver who cannot describe the car he is driving cannot contribute to car development. When Tsunoda said "I never understood the car", he was not merely confessing personal failure. He was accidentally revealing that Red Bull lost a critical data channel for the whole season. It is a two-way loss. The driver loses the chance to improve; the team loses a source of development information. In modern F1, driver feedback is an indispensable part of the development loop. Engineers have sensor data, but sensor data cannot replace the subjective perception of a human. A driver who cannot say "the front end loses grip in high-speed entry" deprives engineers of an important development direction. For Red Bull, losing this feedback channel for a full season may have contributed to the team's inability to close the development gap with McLaren in the closing stages. This also raises a question about Red Bull's driver selection process. The stated criterion for choosing Tsunoda was flexibility — adaptability to different cars. But in reality, that flexibility did not transfer to the RB21. This is a failure of the evaluation criterion, not of the driver. Red Bull assessed Tsunoda on his adaptability to understeer-prone cars, then placed him in a car demanding sharpness at the front end — two fundamentally different skills. Red Bull's second seat in this cycle became what I call the poisoned chalice. Three different drivers — Perez, Lawson, Tsunoda — had their careers damaged or their seats removed after short periods. In football, the same phenomenon is visible in the hot seats of big clubs: when one manager fails, blame falls on him. When three consecutive managers fail, people start looking at the club's structure. Red Bull has reached that threshold. Now comes the hardest part, the part I believe most German and English commentary has overlooked. Tsunoda's story is not only the story of a car optimised for Verstappen. It is also the story of an ego that refused to change. There is an alternative reading of the same dataset. If the car truly was undriveable as rumoured, then Tsunoda's inability to adapt was the car's problem. But the RB21 won eight races. It was not a bad car. It was an extremely fast car in the right hands. The problem is that only one driver could extract its peak. A narrow window does not mean there is no window. Verstappen found it; any other driver who fails to find it carries part of the responsibility — not because they are absolutely inferior, but because they did not make the adaptive effort required. I once analysed a similar case in football. When a centre-back is transferred from a low-block defensive system to a high-pressing system, he often fails not because of a lack of ability, but because he cannot abandon old reading habits. The centre-backs who succeed in this transition are those who accept being re-evaluated from scratch, relearning the most basic principles. Tsunoda was not in that group. He said plainly that he was not humble enough to change. And that, more than the car, may be the real reason he lost the seat. The Albon comparison is an appealing but imperfect analogy. Both failed in Red Bull's second seat, and both spoke of the car's excessive sensitivity. But Albon in 2026-2026 was in a different regulation cycle, with a different car. Tsunoda was right to push back: the car is completely different. What matters, however, is not whether the cars were identical, but whether the failure pattern repeated. The same type of failure appeared across three different drivers in three different years. When a failure pattern repeats, it is no longer a random variable. It is a structure. Here I must state my position clearly: talent management at a top team should be designed to diversify, not to optimise for one individual. If the car is designed to maximise Verstappen's points while trading away the entire scoring capacity of the second car, that is a strategic choice with consequences. And the 2026 consequence is now clear: Red Bull lost the constructors' championship. The strategy of one great driver plus one token driver has failed twice in succession. This is no longer a question of who sits in the seat, but a question of car design philosophy. I do not believe in luck; I believe in numbers lined up straight. And the numbers here line up in a straight line: 30 points against 385, one outqualifying win in 27 attempts, no podiums, seat lost. This is not a random sequence. This is the consequence of a design choice made years earlier, and repeated many times. There is one final dimension I want to analyse, related to the driver market. Tsunoda now stands in a market where the primary data about him is a failure story. It is a difficult position for any driver. The transfer market does not buy the present; it buys promises about the future. And Tsunoda's future, after 2026, is a doubted promise. To recover value, he needs a midfield team willing to bet that the RB21, not he, was the cause. But there is a paradox here. If Tsunoda told the truth — that he did not understand the car all season — that also means he could not provide valuable technical feedback to a team. A midfield team considering signing him will wonder: can he contribute to our car's development? That is not an easy question to answer. Meanwhile, Red Bull may face a different problem: if its design philosophy continues to optimise for Verstappen, the second seat will remain unattractive to drivers with different styles. This is a recruitment constraint, not merely a performance issue. The defeat in Luzhniki taught me what victory never admits, and Tsunoda's season at Red Bull adds something more: when a system fails to absorb those outside its mould, the problem is not with those people. The rumoured narrative of an undriveable Red Bull second seat may continue to hold true. But if I had to bet on 2026, I would bet on a different possibility: a smart team will realise that its greatest victory is not optimising for one champion, but building a system capable of nurturing two champions in parallel. When the stands are empty, sport strips off its shell and exposes its skeleton. The second Red Bull seat, under the cold light of data, is no longer a glorious position. It is a test of the adaptive capacity of both driver and team. Verstappen has passed that test for years. Tsunoda did not. The question for the next race, the next season, and the next regulation cycle: will Red Bull revise its car design philosophy, or will it continue to bet on finding a second driver capable of mimicking a genius's feel?

Red Bull's Second Seat: Tsunoda and the Anatomy of a Broken Season

Red Bull's Second Seat: Tsunoda and the Anatomy of a Broken Season

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